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ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH COMMON LAW RECOGNIZES A CAUSE OF ACTION BY A
CONSUMER AGAINST AN ALCOHOL PROVIDER.
A.

Rees and Yost Both Involve Common Law Claims Brought by
Consumers Against Alcohol Providers, and Neither Case Has
Been Overruled.

As set forth in the Brief of Appellants ("Millers' Br.")5 in both Rees v. Albertsons,
Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978), and Yost v. State of Utah, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that a consumer of alcohol has a common law cause of
action against an alcohol provider if the consumer was provided alcohol in violation of
the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. (See Millers' Br. at 8-15.) Neither case has been
overruled.
Gastronomy attempts to downplay the clear import of Rees and Yost by asserting
that they involve third-party claims, not first-party claims. Yet the Utah Supreme Court
has specifically stated that "fpjrior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act9 Utah did not
recognize a third-party cause of action against dramshops." Adkins v. Uncle Bart's,
Inc., 2000 UT 14, If 15, 1 P.3d 528 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court declared that the
Dramshop Act was enacted to "fill the void" that existed at common law for third parties
to recover against alcohol providers. Id. ^ 16. Given that the Dramshop Act was not
effective until May 1981, the Utah Supreme Court in Adkins indirectly acknowledged
that neither Rees, decided in 1978, nor Yost, decided in October 1981 based upon preDramshop Act law, recognized a third-party cause of action against dramshops.
Accordingly, Gastronomy cannot simply dismiss Rees and Yost as cases recognizing
i

third-party claims when—according to the express pronouncement of the Utah Supreme
Court—Utah did not recognize third-party claims until the Dramshop Act was enacted.
Further, Gastronomy's reliance upon MacKay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT
15, 995 P.2d 1233, as verification of the "limited scope" of Rees and Yost is misplaced,
given the Court's inaccurate interpretation of Rees and Yost as cases involving third-party
claims. The Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Rees and Yost recognize a duty on the
part of dramshops to first-party claimants, including intoxicated persons, as well as a
common law cause of action by such first-party claimants against dramshops for violation
of the laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors or intoxicated persons. As the Utah
Supreme Court explained in Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167 (Utah
1991), citing both Rees and Yost as authority, "fpjrior to the enactment of the Dramshop
Act, Utah common law allowed an intoxicated minor to recover against the provider of
alcohol on the basis of the dramshop owner's negligence in providing the alcohol." Id.
at 1169 (emphasis added). "A comparable situation" the Court has acknowledged,
"would be the unlawful sale of liquor to a drunken person." Yost, 640 P.2d at 1046 n.4
(emphasis added).
Thus, under Rees, Yost and Horton, the Millers are allowed to recover against
Gastronomy based upon Gastronomy's negligence in providing Mr. Miller with excessive
amounts of alcohol when he was clearly intoxicated, which lead to his untimely death.
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B.

The Cases Cited By Gastronomy Are Inapposite.
1.

The Holding in Adkins is Limited to Third-Party
Claims.

Gastronomy relies almost exclusively on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Adkins for the proposition that no common law claim exists in Utah against an alcohol
provider. (See Brief of Appellee/Defendant ("Appellee Br.'9) at 11-13.) Yet Gastronomy
conveniently ignores the fact that Adkins involved a third-party claim against a dramshop,
not a first-party claim. Gastronomy's attempt to expand the Court's holding in Adkins to
include first-party claims is simply not supported by the facts at issue in Adkins.
In Adkins, the parents of a third party who was killed by an intoxicated driver sued
the dramshop as third-party claimants. Adkins, 2000 UT 14, ^| 5. The Utah Supreme
Court held that third-party claims against dramshops did not exist at common law;
therefore, the trial court had properly dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence claims. Id. ^
18. The Court in Adkins, however, did not consider whether the patron of the dramshop
would have a claim for his injuries; therefore, Adkins is inapplicable to the Millers'
claims.
Indeed, despite Gastronomy's argument that Adkins forecloses any common law
claim against an alcohol provider, including a consumer's first-party claim, nearly every
portion of the Adkins opinion that Gastronomy quotes in its brief refers specifically to
"third parties" and common law claims brought by third parties against alcohol providers.
(See Appellee Br. at 11-13.) It is misleading for Gastronomy to assert that the Utah
Supreme Court rejected the existence of any common law claim in Utah against an

alcohol provider when the Court in Adkins expressly and repeatedly limited its holding to
third-party claims. See, e.g., Adkins, 2000 UT 14,fflf18 & 20 ("[w]e therefore conclude
that because a third-party cause of action against dramshops did not exist in this state at
common law, the plaintiffs' common law negligence claim against the dramshop
defendants was properly dismissed by the trial court" (emphasis added); "[w]e have
established that there is no common law basis to support a third-party negligence claim
against dramshops" (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, Adkins does not excuse Gastronomy of its duty to Mr. Miller or its
liability for his death because Adkins only addresses third-party claims. Gastronomy's
misguided arguments to the contrary are directly controverted by the express language in
Adkins.
2.

Beach is Factually Distinguishable and Incorrectly
Interprets Yost.

Gastronomy also tries to justify its position that Utah does not recognize a firstparty common law cause of action against an alcohol provider with dicta contained in a
footnote in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (1986). (See Appellee Br. at 1011, 13.) Beach, however, is factually distinguishable and incorrectly interprets Yost
through gratis dicta.

Moreover, in Beach, the Court cited an analogous case from

Oregon in support of its analysis which was subsequently abrogated in favor of
recognizing a first-party claim against an alcohol provider. As such, Beach does not
excuse Gastronomy from its duty to Mr. Miller or its liability for his death.

In Beach, a student brought a claim against the University of Utah seeking
damages for personal injuries she sustained when she fell after drinking alcohol during a
field trip sponsored by the University. Beach, 726 P.2d at 414. On appeal, the Court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs claim,
concluding that no special relationship existed between the parties requiring the
University to protect the plaintiff from the consequences of her voluntary intoxication.
Id. The case did not involve any dramshop, and the Court specifically stated that "[t]here
is no claim here that the University furnished alcohol to [the plaintiff]." Id. at 417 n.3.
Thus, Beach is irrelevant.
Further, even though the Court stated in Beach that no claim was made by the
plaintiff that the University furnished her with alcohol, the Court stated that "any liability
premised directly on the illegal furnishing of alcohol would have to arise from a statutory
provision."

Id. at 417 n.3.

The Court relied upon this premise, based upon its

interpretation of dictum in Yost, for its conclusion that
[t]he Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from those improperly
providing liquor, but does not allow the intoxicated person to recover from
the provider. Therefore, one injured as a result of his or her own voluntary
but unlawful intoxication would appear to be without remedy against the
provider of the alcohol, either under the Dramshop Act or under common
law. Cf. Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 271, 279, 604 P.2d 1261, 126465(1980).
Given the faulty premise upon which the Court in Beach relied, however, the
Court's conclusion was incorrect. Yost recognized that a minor consumer is entitled to
apportion negligence to an alcohol provider for illegally selling alcohol to the minor
consumer, and that the unlawful sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person presented a
5

comparable situation. Yost, 640 P.2d at 1046 & n.4. The Court thereby acknowledged
that an alcohol provider owes a duty to minors and intoxicated persons, independent of
the Dramshop Act, not to serve them alcohol, and that a common law cause of action
exists for minors and intoxicated persons against alcohol providers for violation of the
laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol to them. Indeed, citing both Rees and Yost, the Utah
Supreme Court in Horton affirmed that "[p]rior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act,
Utah common law allowed an intoxicated minor to recover against the provider of
alcohol on the basis of the dramshop owner's negligence in providing the alcohol"
Horton, 821 P.2d at 1169 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Oregon case cited at the end of footnote 3 in Beach as analogous
authority, Miller v. City of Portland, 604 P.2d 1261 (Or. 1980), was later abrogated in
favor of recognizing a first-party common law claim against an alcohol provider. See
Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 9 P.3d 710, 718 (Or. 2000) ("[A]
plaintiff may bring a common-law negligence action against a person or entity that
negligently supplied alcohol to the plaintiff when he or she already was visibly
intoxicated and the plaintiff suffered injuries caused by that negligent conduct.").

1

For a discussion of the Fulmer case, see Millers' Br. at 21-22.
6

3.

Utah Has Not Followed the Majority
Espoused in Bridges.

Position

Gastronomy cites Bridges v. Park Place Entm't, 860 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 2003), as
representative of the majority position that a first-party consumer does not have a cause
of action against an alcohol provider—a position that Gastronomy claims Utah followed
in Beach and Adkins. That is simply not the case.
First, Adkins was a classic third-party case against an alcohol provider.

See

Adkins, 2000 UT 14, If 5. The Court in Adkins did not consider whether the consumer
would have a claim against the alcohol provider for his injuries and, therefore, the Court
did not follow the "majority position" with regard to first-party claims. See id. ^ 18 &
20.
Similarly, Beach involved a claim by a student against the University of Utah. See
Beach, 726 P.2d at 414. No dramshop was involved, nor was any claim made by the
student that the University of Utah furnished her with alcohol. See id. at All n.3. The
only mention in Beach of first-party claims against dramshops is dicta contained in a
footnote, and even then, the Court plainly misconstrued Yost. Thus, Beach can hardly be
said to evidence an adoption of the majority position in Utah.
Rather, as set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Rees and Yost,
and later confirmed by Horton, make it abundantly clear that Utah has sided with the
minority position that first-party consumers have a common law cause of action for
negligence against alcohol providers.

7

II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION IN LYONS IS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE COURT.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo.

1989), is directly on point both factually and analytically. Moreover, the court in Lyons
provided a thorough and persuasive analysis that should be followed by this Court in
holding that a consumer of alcohol may bring a negligence action against a dramshop to
recover for injuries caused by the dramshop's unlawful sale of alcohol to the consumer
when the consumer was visibly intoxicated. Id. at 1260.
Despite the fact that several other courts have come to the same conclusion as the
court in Lyons {see Millers' Br. at 18-23)—decisions that Gastronomy does not address—
Gastronomy attempts to divert the Court's focus away from Lyons and the analysis
therein by asserting that Lyons is an aberration in Colorado law and citing the dissent in
Lyons as consistent with Utah law. {See Appellee Br. at 16-17.) Gastronomy, however,
is wrong.
First, the fact that the Colorado General Assembly enacted legislation following
the court's decision in Lyons that precludes a patron from suing a dramshop is irrelevant.
The Utah legislature has not enacted any such legislation following the decisions in Rees,
Yost and Horton that recognized a common law first-party claim against negligent
providers of alcohol. Indeed, despite repeated amendments to the Dramshop Act, the
Utah legislature has never amended the Dramshop Act to preclude a patron's common
law claims against a dramshop, which were recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as
early as 1978 in Rees.

Second, the dissent in Lyons reflects a gross mischaracterization of the effect of
recognizing a first-party claim against an alcohol provider. In his dissent, Justice Rovira
claims that giving a first-party consumer a cause of action against the alcohol provider
"shifts the responsibility from the imbiber" and is thus "contary to sound public policy."
Id. at 1262 (Rouira, J., dissenting). Yet, the Millers are not asking the Court to "shift
blame"2 or claiming that Mr. Miller is not responsible for his conduct. Instead, the
Millers merely request that a jury be allowed to apportion fault among all who are at fault
as required by the Comparative Fault Statute and the Utah Supreme Court decisions in
Rees and Yost. Clearly, Gastronomy should bear some responsibility for illegally serving
excessive amounts of alcohol to Mr. Miller when he was visibly intoxicated and should
not escape responsibility simply because it was Mr. Miller—and not a third party—who
was killed.3 The question of how much responsibility Gastronomy bears is a question of
fact that should be reserved for the fact-finder.

2

Indeed, under the allocation of fault statutes in Utah, Mr. Miller's negligence
must be considered in comparison to Gastronomy's negligence in serving him alcohol
when he was intoxicated. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38, et seq.
3

The absurdity of immunizing Gastronomy from liability for Mr. Miller's death
merely because Mr. Miller drank to an excess what Gastronomy provided was articulated
in the decision in Lyons:
One who stands behind a bar and serves drink after drink to a visibly intoxicated
customer engages in behavior which is as opprobrious as that of the customer. We
think it 'morally indefensible' to condone the conduct of a tavern owner who, so
long as the patron is able to pay, continues to serve the intoxicated patron a steady
stream of alcohol. In our view the conduct of both the patron and the tavern
owner is reprehensible and should be discouraged. Insulating tavern owners, as a
matter of law, from liability does not send the message that they, as well as their
patrons, must be accountable for their actions.
9

III.

THE DECISION IN GILGER DOES NOT SUPPORT GASTRONOMY'S
ALLEGATION THAT UTAH'S DRAMSHOP ACT PREEMPTS THE
COMMON LAW CLAIMS OF A CONSUMER AGAINST AN ALCOHOL
PROVIDER.
Gastronomy incorrectly relies upon Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, 997 P.2d

305, to support its argument that the Dramshop Act preempts the Millers' first-party
common law claims. A careful review of the Court's analysis in Gilger reveals that the
Utah Supreme Court only recognized the Dramshop Act as a legislative scheme of
inclusion and exclusion of alcohol providers from the Act's civil liability provisions. In
other words, the Act provides a comprehensive scheme of which alcohol providers may
be liable to third parties under the Act.
In Gilger, the Court described the Dramshop Act as imposing "something akin to
strict civil liability on commercial establishments and social hosts who give, sell, or
otherwise provide liquor to specific classes of individuals who then become intoxicated
and injure third parties." Gilger, 2000 UT 23, 1f 12 (emphasis added). Following that
pronouncement, the Court indicated that social hosts—like the defendant in Gilger—who
serve only beer to their guests have been excluded from civil liability under the Act.
Indeed, "the exclusion from dramshop liability was as explicit and knowingly crafted as
the inclusion of the other providers of alcohol" Id. (emphasis added).
Immediately following the Court's discussion of which alcohol providers are
subject to the Dramshop Act's civil liability provisions, the Court stated that "[t]he Act
evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability for liquor providers. Its very

770 P.2d at 1255 (emphasis added).
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comprehensiveness suggests a purpose and intent to preempt inconsistent common law."
Id. Gastronomy claims that this last quotation from Gilger evidences a pronouncement
from the Court that the Dramshop Act preempts any common law claims against
providers of alcohol for consumption on the premises. A careful consideration of the
analysis provided by the Court, however, shows Gastronomy's interpretation is flawed.
Specifically, the Court in Gilger recognized that the Act imposes strict liability
upon alcohol providers in favor of innocent third parties who are injured at the hands of
persons illegally served by the providers.

The Court then discussed which alcohol

providers are covered by the Act and, therefore, subject to the civil liability provisions of
the Act, determining that the Act's exclusion of social hosts serving beer was "explicit
and knowingly crafted." Id.% 12. While the Court later stated that the Act evidences an
"overall scheme of regulation" for alcohol providers, in the context of the Court's prior
analysis, the only logical interpretation of that statement is that the Court recognized the
Act as a comprehensive scheme of regulation as to which alcohol providers are
potentially subject to liability to third parties.
In fact, the Court expressly qualified its reference to the Act as an "overall scheme
of regulation" in the next sentence of the opinion: "We find additional evidence that the
legislative scheme of inclusion and exclusion of dramshop liability was intended to
occupy the field of liability in the Act's damage cap provisions." Id. f 13 (emphasis
added). The Court found that the Act amounts to a scheme of inclusion and exclusion of
alcohol providers subject to potential liability to third parties, which was intended by the
Utah legislature to occupy the field of liability for those alcohol providers to third
ll

parties. The Court did not even consider first-party claims. As such, Gilger does not
support Gastronomy's assertion that the Millers' first-party claims against Gastronomy
are preempted by the Dramshop Act.
Moreover, the legislative purpose of the Dramshop Act further supports a finding
that the Act does not preempt first-party claims. Gastronomy does not dispute that the
legislative purpose of the Act is to "compensate innocent third parties by making
dramshop owners strictly liable without regard to the finding of faulty wrongful intent,
or negligent conduct on their part." Adkins, 2000 UT 14, f 16 (emphasis added).
Indeed, it was enacted to "fill the void" that existed at common law to provide third
parties with a remedy against dramshops. Id. (emphasis added). The Dramshop Act does
not—nor was it ever intended—to address first-party claims.4
The Court in Gilger determined that the Dramshop Act provides a scheme of
regulation as to which alcohol providers are subject to potential liability to third parties.
Because first-party claims against alcohol providers are not addressed by the Act and
were not discussed by Gilger, the Act does not preempt the Millers' claims against
Gastronomy. Gastronomy's theory that first-party claims are preempted—except in the
case of minors—is simply not supported by Gilger and is contrary to the law in Utah

4

Not only is there no mention of first-party claims in the Act, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 32A-14a-101, et seq., but no Utah case has held that a common law claim brought by a
first-party consumer against a dramshop is preempted by the Act. In fact, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that the Dramshop Act does not cover liability claims brought by
intoxicated persons who are injured as a result of alcohol providers serving them too
much alcohol, or by those persons' heirs. Richardson v. Matador Steak House, Inc., 948
P.2d 347, 349-50 (Utah 1997).
17

which recognizes a common law claim by a first-party against a dramshop. See Rees,
587 P.2d at 133; Yost, 640 P.2d at 1046 n.4.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Allen and Beverly Miller respectfully request that the
Court reverse the district court's Final Order granting Gastronomy's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED:

November 9, 2004.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

ithan B. Wilcox
Heather M. Sneddon
Attorneys for Appellants
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